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The Precarious Constitutionality of

RICO Civil Remedies

To determine whether an act of the legislature is penal or regulatory in character is a problem that has been extremely difficult and elusive of solution.'
Mr. Justice Goldberg
The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of
procedure.2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter

In order to protect interstate commerce and to attack the economic base of organized crime, 3 the United States Congress
en4
1970.
of
Act
Control
Crime
Organized
the
of
IX
acted Title
1. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 473 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
2. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
3. The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread 'activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct
and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime
derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such
illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and
other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the
stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security and
undermine the general welfare of the nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of legally admissible
evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and
because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws (84 Stat.) 1073.
4. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Section 1961 is a
definitional provision; § 1062 names the prohibited racketeering activities; § 1963
provides for criminal penalties; § 1964 provides civil sanctions and remedies; and
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Title IX, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), forbids any person5 from investing income derived
from a pattern6 or racketeering activity7 in an enterprise8 that af§§ 1965-1968 are procedural devices providing for venue, expedition of actions
and broadened discovery and hearings. [The Act is hereinafter referred to as
RICO when referring to the entire Act, RICO criminal action when referring to
the criminal provisions of the RICO Act, and RICO civil action when referring to
civil provisions of the Act.]
5. "[A] person includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (emphasis added). See United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976) (includes small business enterprises and is not limited to organized crime
figures).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) sets two as the minimum number of racketeering acts
necessary to create a pattern.
7. The definitions used in this chapter are:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotics or other dangerous drugs which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, sections 471,
472 and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating
to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29,
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments
and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected
with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
any law of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
8. In order to violate the statute a person must acquire or maintain an inter-
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fects interstate commerce;' from acquiring an interest in any en-

terprise through racketeering activity;1 0 from participatingin any

enterprise through a racketeering activity;" or from conspiring to
violate any of the above proscriptions." The RICO statute provides for both criminal prosecutions and civil suits and criminal
penalties's as well as civil sanctions and remedies. Section 1964,

containing the civil remedies, gives the United States District
Courts jurisdiction to prevent and to restrain violations of Section
5
1962" through orders requiring divestiture, restrictions on future
activities and investments by means of injunctive relief, dissoluest in, or control of an enterprise, or participate in the conduct of its affairs. Id. §
1962(b). Enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
though not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4). See United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d
1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (legitimate business was a front for narcotics trafficking),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1974); United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.
1978) (auto dealership), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909. (1979); United States v.
Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (beauty college); United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (foreign corporation is an enterprise), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (theater).
Government agencies have qualified as enterprises within the meaning of the
statute. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was held to be
an enterprise in United States v. Frumenta, 563 F.2d 1683 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978). See United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.
1977) (police department is an enterprise within the meaning of the statute), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
An enterprise includes wholly illegitimate (criminal) enterprises. United
States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981). Cf. United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (expressing the older view that only legitimate activity
was an "enterprise" to be protected from racketeering).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
10. Id. § 1962(b).
11. Id. § 1962(c).
12. Id. § 1962(d).
13. Violations of any of the prohibitions of § 1962 (see supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text) may result in a fine of up to $25,000, imprisonment for not
more than 20 years, or both, plus forfeiture of ill-gotten gains as well as any interest the defendant has acquired or maintained in a business in violation of Title
IX. Id. § 1963.
14. See supra notes 8-12.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). Divestiture under the RICO Act is the same remedy
provided for in antitrust law. This remedy is a court order to a defendant to sell
or otherwise terminate his interest in property, securities or other assets of the
enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316 (1961).
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tion" or reorganization of the enterprise or other orders at the
court's discretion, 7 and treble damages.' 8
The civil remedies are harsh, which raises the issue of whether
the RICO civil remedies are in substance criminal penalties. This
is significant because punishment and deterrence of criminal conduct are purposes of the criminal law,' s not the civil law. This
criminal/civil distinction is important because the classification determines what procedural protections are available to the defendant. The United States Constitution, state constitutions, statutes
and case law provide far greater procedural protection to a defendant in a criminal case'0 than is afforded to a defendant in a civil
case."2
This Comment will analyze the differences between civil,
quasi-criminal and criminal cases, and demonstrate that RICO
civil remedies are civil (regulatory-compensatory) in nature, rather
than criminal (penal), or quasi-criminal. In making this determination, this Comment will examine the legislative history of RICO
and its relationship to antitrust precedent, and apply to RICO the
tests currently used by the United States Supreme Court to determine borderlines between civil, quasi-criminal and criminal laws.
The application of the Supreme Court tests is not just a mechanical procedure, because the determination of whether an act of the
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). A dissolution requires a defendant to terminate the
entire enterprise. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S.
464 (1969), reh'g denied, 399 U.S. 937 (1970).
17. The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter [18 U.S.C.
§ 1962] by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities
as investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise
engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce;
or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
18. Id.§ 1964(c). According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (rev. 5th ed.
1979), treble damages are "damages given by statute in certain cases consisting of
single damages found by the jury actually tripled in amount." See, e.g., § 4 of the
Clayton Act which provides for treble damages for antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C.

§ 15.

19. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 21, 23-24 (1972).
20. See infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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Congress is penal or regulatory in nature is a problem that "has
been extremely difficult and elusive of solution."' 2 2 The classification is crucial since it determines which procedural protections are

available, and "[t]he history of American
freedom is, in no small
3
measure, the history of procedure.'
MECHANICS OF THE

RICO STATUTE

A RICO civil suit may be brought in federal court against a
RICO statute violator by the Attorney General' 4 or "any person
injured in his business property."' 5 A judgment in favor of the
United States in any RICO criminal proceeding will be considered
res judicata' and will estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in a subsequent RICO civil
proceeding. 7 The Act provides for broad venue' s and service of
process;"9 it contains a "use immunity"3 0 provision and a "civil in-

22. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
23. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b).
25. Id. § 1964(c).
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), defines res adjudicata
(a less common spelling of res judicata) as a term that "designates a point or
question or subject-matter which was in controversy or dispute and has been authoritatively and finally settled by the decision of a court; that issuable fact once
legally determined is conclusive as between parties in [the] same action or [a]
subsequent proceeding." (emphasis added).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).
28. Id. § 1965(a) provides: "Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States
for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts
his affairs." This parallels the venue provision for antitrust suits brought against
corporations under the antitrust statute. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). In antitrust cases
if personal jurisdiction is proper, venue is proper. See, e.g., Pacific Tobacco Corp.
v. Am. Tobacco Corp., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844 (D. Or. 1972).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) provides:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of
the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require
that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the
court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for
that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States
by the marshall thereof.
30. "Use immunity" refers to an order of the court which "compels witnesses to give testimony of self-incriminating nature but provides that such testimony may not be used as evidence in subsequent prosecution of witness." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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vestigative demand"81 provision, similar to those used in antitrust
actions.
The RICO criminal and RICO civil provisions of the Act interact, because the plaintiff in a RICO civil case must establish that
the defendant has violated the RICO criminal provisions. 2 Since
there is interaction between RICO criminal and RICO civil actions,
the case law interpreting the RICO criminal sections of the statute
is relevant to RICO civil actions. For example, if the courts in
RICO criminal cases liberally construe RICO statutory concepts
such as "enterprise" 38 or "person,"" then there will be a corresponding expansion of the scope of the RICO civil actions.
City of Milwaukee v. Hansen" illustrates the mechanics of the
RICO statute. Ronald and Steven Hansen were convicted on fed31. 18 U.S.C. § 1968. A "civil investigative demand" is issued by the Attorney General requiring a person to produce material for examination. The unique
feature of a civil investigative demand is that the order is issued prior to the
institution of a civil or criminal proceeding. The Attorney General may issue such
a demand if "he has reason to believe that any person or enterprise may be in
possession, custody, or control of any documentary materials relevant" to an investigation of an Act violation. Id. § 1968(a). The Attorney General's civil investigative demand must state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation under investigation and describe with definiteness and certainty the
documentary material to be produced. The demand shall also prescribe a return
date that gives a reasonable period of time within which the material demanded
may be gathered for inspection. The demand must identify the custodian to
whom such material shall be made available. Id. § 1968(b).
The effect of such a civil investigative demand is to insure that documents
and evidence are preserved since it provides an element of surprise and is more
efficient and time saving than traditional discovery devices. The civil investigative
demand for antitrust cases can be found in 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976 and Supp. IV
1980).
32. The criminal and the civil provisions both require proving the same violations. The major difference between RICO criminal and RICO civil cases is that
their respective sanctions are different. The civil plaintiff must prove that the
defendant has either invested income derived from a pattern of racketeering in an
enterprise that affects interstate commerce, or acquired an interest in an enterprise through racketeering activity, or participatedin any enterprise through a
racketeering activity. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. This is precisely what must be proven in a criminal case. See the racketeering activities
listed supra note 7. These racketeering activities are all traditional criminal activities; therefore, the plaintiff in a civil case must prove the elements of a crime, in
addition to a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1961(5) sets two as the minimum number of racketeering acts necessary to create a pattern.
33. See supra note 8.
34. See supra note 5.
35. No. 77-C-246 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
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eral criminal charges of arson involving a number of properties."'
Since arson is a racketeering activity87 and the Hansen brothers
were convicted of several charges of arson, their conduct can be
described as a pattern 8 of racketeering activity. The Hansen
brothers were an enterprise because they were "a group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal entity." 9 Therefore, the
Hansen brothers were participating in an enterprise through a
40
racketeering activity, within the meaning of the RICO statute.
Following the federal criminal conviction, the City of Milwaukee filed a RICO civil suit under sections 1964(a), 1964(c) and
1965(a). 4' The City sought treble damages in the amount of
$577,584, representing three times the cost of water, depreciation
of equipment and firefighter's salaries.' It also sought court costs
48
and attorney's fees.
The court in this RICO civil suit granted default judgment
against one of the defendants. Summary judgment was rendered
against the other defendant because the court rejected his attempt
to challenge his culpability by treating the criminal conviction as
res judicata as to the issues in the RICO civil action. The City
proved its damages and obtained a judgment against the defendant
for $577,584 plus costs and attorney's fees.
Certain remarks of John F. Kitzke, Assistant City Attorney for
the City of Milwaukee, raise the constitutional issue of whether the
RICO civil remedies are in substance criminal penalties. He stated
that it was the intention of James B. Brennan, the City Attorney,
"that we [the attorney's office for the city] should make arson as
expensive as possible, not solely to obtain money for the city, but
for the far more important premise of dissuading people from
damaging property and the possibility of killing or injuring people
8
by the act of arson."
If RICO civil remedies are criminal penalties, greater procedu36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

United States v. Hansen, No. 76-CR-129 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
See supra note 7.
See supra note 6.
See supra note 8.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

41. See supra notes 17, 18 & 28.
42. The actual damages were $192,528.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 authorizes recovery of attorney's fees and court costs.

44. See supra notes 21-22.
45. Letter from John F. Kitzke, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Milwaukee to the Northern Illinois University Law Review (July 23, 1980) (on file

with the Northern Illinois University Law Review).
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ral protections are available than if they are civil remedies. The
United States Constitution and the rules the courts have fashioned
for interpreting it provide for a number of protections available to
the defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Procedures and Protections Available in a Criminal Case
The exclusionary rule, engrafted upon the fourth amendment,
applies in a criminal case to protect defendants against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4" This amendment is enforced by exclud47
ing at a criminal trial evidence gained through its violation.

The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
also applicable in a criminal case. 4 8 Even in a civil case, a defendant may assert the privilege against self-incrimination if his response to a question could be used against him in a subsequent
criminal case; however, the burden is upon the defendant to
demonstrate that the response could incriminate him. In a criminal
case, the privilege is absolute, and the government must "shoulder
the entire load."'
46. U.S.

CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
47. This exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In order to obtain the benefit of the exclusionary rule
the defendant must show (1) government conduct in violation of the fourth
amendment; (2) a causal link between the government illegality and the evidence
sought to be excluded (thus if evidence obtained illegally leads to other evidence,
that other evidence must also be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree");
(3) the government illegality violated the defendant's own expectation of privacy
(it is not enough to show that the evidence was gained through a violation of a
third person's fourth amendment rights). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Rakas v. Illinois, 349 U.S. 128 (1978). There is an important exception to
the exclusionary rule: the illegally obtained evidence can be used for impeachment purposes.
The main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from violating the fourth amendment rights of individuals but the exclusionary rule only
applies in a criminal case. For example, if the police were to break into the home
of X without a warrant and seize evidence of a crime, that evidence which was
seized in violation of the fourth amendment could be excluded in a criminal trial.
However, that same evidence could be used in a civil trial.
48. "INjor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminalcase to be a witness against himself ....
"U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
49. "The privilege contributes toward a fair state-individual balance by re-
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The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require the prosecutor in a criminal case to prove each element of the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt."" The policy underlying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is to
require a near-absolute degree of certainty of guilt so that an innocent person is not punished. 5' A corollary to this is that there must
be a near-absolute degree of certainty that a defendant is proven
guilty before punishment is imposed.
The fifth amendment requires the grand jury's "presentment"2
or indictment" 8 as a prerequisite to a trial of a "capital or other
infamous crime."" Other less serious federal crimes require an "information"" as a prerequisite to a trial. The requirements are similar for state criminal cases." The purpose of an indictment, presentment or information is to inform the defendant of the nature
of the accusation. There can be no trial, conviction or punishment
quiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load." 8 J. WIOmoa, EVmDNCE § 2251, at 317 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
50. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned.
... Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

51. Id.
52. "A 'presentment,' properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury
of any offense from their own knowledge or observation without any bill of indictment laid before them. . . ." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 46 (1905) (quoting 4

W.

BLACKSTONE, CoMmzNTARms

*301).

53. "An indictment is a written accusation of a crime drawn up by the public prosecuting attorney and submitted to the grand jury, and by them found and
presented on oath or affirmation as a true bill. Its object is to inform the accused
of the charge against him." 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 7 (1944).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury ....")
55. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 11 (1944) defines an information as "a written accusation of [a] crime proferred by the public prosecuting officer without the intervention of a grand jury. It is in the nature of, and takes the
place of, an indictment."
56. See generally 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information §§ 1-16 (1944).
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without conforming with these formal methods of accusation."
In a criminal case a verdict cannot be directed against a defendant." A judge may not withdraw a case from the jury and render
a guilty verdict. The policy underlying the prohibition against directed verdicts in a criminal case is the ensurance that a defendant
is convicted by an impartial jury. The prohibition also protects the
criminal defendant from an arbitrary guilty verdict rendered by a.
judge.5 9
A defendant in a criminal case has the right, under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, to be present at trial and face his accusors. 60 The sixth amendment also provides the defendant in a
criminal case the rights to appointed counsel" and to a jury trial .
57. See 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 1 (1944).
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), defines a directed verdict as follows: "In a case in which the party with the burden of proof has failed
to present a prima facie case for jury consideration, the trial judge may order the
entry of a verdict without allowing the jury to consider it, because, as a matter of
law, there can only be one such verdict."
59. The judge may, however, direct a verdict of acquittal in favor of a defendant. See United States v. Brown, 456 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1971) (mandatory where
insufficient evidence to warrant conviction), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972). See
also United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.) (no error in reserved motion
where sufficient evidence to go to jury), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966).
60. The Constitution guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witness against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of
being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination,
which cannot be had except by direct and personal putting of questions
and obtaining immediate answers.
5 J. W[GMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 150 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) (emphasis
added).
61. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and counsel must be appointed for indigent defendants in felony trials. The Court later extended the right to appointed counsel to
all criminal prosecutions that result in imprisonment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972). See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (limiting the right to
appointed counsel to criminal prosecutions that actually result in imprisonment).
62. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, provides that: "The trial of all crimes except in
case of impeachment shall be by jury." (emphasis added) The sixth amendment
provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
" (emphasis added). It should
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The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides
that an individual shall not "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" 8 and prohibits the imposition of multiple punishments for a single offense." Imprisonment"5 and fines, ss imposed after the person has been punished
once, are prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. The clause also
prohibits retrial of the same offense after acquittal s7 or conviction.68 It is essential that the defendant establish that the sanction
he challenges is punishment because the double jeopardy clause attaches only to criminal cases. The double jeopardy clause is very
significant in the RICO context because, if the RICO civil remedies
are punishment, the government would have to choose between
filing a RICO criminal case or a RICO civil case. The government
could not bring both a criminal and a civil action because the
double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishments for a single
offense. If the government trial of a RICO criminal case resulted in
acquittal, and the RICO civil suit is in substance an attempt to
punish, the double jeopardy clause would bar the civil suit. Similarly, if the RICO civil suit is in substance an attempt to punish
and the RICO civil suit is filed first, then a subsequent RICO criminal prosecution would be barred.
Procedures and Protections Available in A Civil Case
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule which applies in
be noted that this right only applies to criminal cases and not to quasi-criminal

cases. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50 (1914). The sixth amendment right

to trial by jury was made applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in the case of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

(1968). The constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to petty crimes.

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). A petty crime is defined by the

length of the prison sentence. A six month sentence, for example, is petty. Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).

In RICO civil cases there would be no sixth amendment constitutional right
to a jury trial because a prison sentence is not one of the civil remedies; however,
if the plaintiff is seeking damages the defendant is entitled to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment.
63. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause was held to be applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
64. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873).

65. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (imprisonment).
66. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (fine and imprisonment).

67. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
68. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 186-88 (1889).
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criminal cases does not apply in civil cases. The effect of this is
that evidence obtained through a violation of the defendant's
fourth amendment rights may be introduced in a civil case despite
the fact that the defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated. 9
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
limited in a civil case. It applies only if the solicited response
would provide incriminating information that could be used
against the defendant in a subsequent criminal trial. If the defendant in a civil case asserts the fifth amendment privilege, it is possible for the government to grant the defendant "use immunity"
which would bar the use of the civil testimony in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution of the defendant. If the evidence or
solicited response would not incriminate the defendant, then he
70
must testify.

In a civil case the plaintiff must prove his case by "a preponderance of the evidence,"" while a criminal action requires proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." The preponderance of the evidence

7
standard of proof has been equated with a "more likely than not"'

test. The lower standard of proof makes it far easier to prove a
civil case than to prove a criminal case. In certain exceptional
types of civil cases, the standard is "clear and convincing" proof.78

69. In a civil case there is no fourth amendment exclusionary rule. However,
the defendant whose fourth amendment rights have been violated may file a civil
action in federal court and obtain money damages to redress the injury. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

70. With regard to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,

a defendant in a civil action cannot refuse to testify. United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923). Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1896) and Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893) do not hold to the contrary
where the sanction involved is remedial rather than punitive.
71. 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
72. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 24647 (1944).

73. "Clear and convincing" is a stricter standard than "preponderance of
the evidence" but it is less strict than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Clear and convincing has been utilized to measure the necessary persuasion for a charge of fraud, or of undue influence; for the existence and
contents of a lost deed or will; for a parol gift or an agreement to bequeath or devise by will or to adopt; for mutual mistake sufficient to
justify reformation of an instrument; for a parol or constructive trust; for
an oral contract as a basis of specific performance; for impeaching a notary's certificate of acknowledgment; for prior anticipatory use of an in-

vention; for an agreement to hold a deed absolute as a mortgage; and for
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A directed verdict, available in a civil case 7 ' but not in a criminal case, gives the judge more discretion in a civil than in a criminal case. In civil cases all that is necessary to commence an action
is to file a complaint with the court, a simpler method of commencing a suit than the formal indictment, presentment or information which are prerequisites to the trial of a criminal action."5
Nor does the defendant in a civil case have a constitutional right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." This valuable right
of the criminal law provides the defendant with an opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses."
The double jeopardy clause does not attach to a civil proceeding. Consequently, the government may appeal from an adverse
decision in the civil proceeding."8 If RICO civil remedies are in
substance compensatory, rather than punitive, double jeopardy
will not attach, and the government will be able to file both a criminal prosecution and a RICO civil action. If the government loses
in the RICO criminal case, it will not be barred from obtaining a
favorable verdict in the civil case. It would be a routine matter to
obtain a summary judgment in a civil case if the government had
previously obtained a guilty verdict in the RICO criminal case, besundry classes of cases in local practice.

9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498(3), at 424-31 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981) (emphasis

deleted.)
74. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 265-67 (1877); United
States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
75. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
76. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896); Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v.
United States, 232 U.S. 647, 660 (1914).
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. The state may appeal from an adverse decision in a civil case. See
United States v. Clafiin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878); United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475
(1896); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
There is a right of appeal in the event you run into the wrong judge and
he tosses it out, and it happens. It happens in the federal courts and in
the state courts. You all know that. You also have a right of appeal after
trial because there is no double jeopardy. And if the verdict goes the
wrong way you can appeal that on the evidence. In a criminal case if the
verdict goes against you, that's it; jeopardy attaches and you can't go
back again.
Lecture of Brian Gelting, Cornell Institute on Organized Crime Summer Program
on Labor Racketeering (August 9, 1979), reprinted in 1 G. BLAKEY, TECHNIQUES IN

THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME 42 (1980). (Brian Gelt-

ing is counsel and director of the House Republican Conference Task Force on
Crime and a partner in the law firm of Leonard, Cohen, Gelting and Sher.)
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cause the criminal verdict will have a res judicata effect in the civil
case. 7 Of course, this res judicata effect is dependent on RICO
civil actions being in substance civil actions rather than criminal
prosecutions.
Procedures and Protections Available in a Quasi-CriminalCase
Two types of cases are labeled "quasi-criminal" 8P-suits for
forfeitures8 ' and suits for penalties~ll-since they have both civil
and criminal components. The procedural protections afforded to a
defendant in a quasi-criminal case are less than those afforded in a
criminal case but greater than those provided in a civil case. The
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination attaches to
quasi-criminal cases 8 as does the fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its accompanying
exclusionary rule." Although a quasi-criminal case is in the nature
of a criminal case, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is
79. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, merchandise was imported in violation of the customs laws so that the defendants were
subject to fines and imprisonment. In addition to these sanctions, the merchandise was subject to forfeiture. Boyd filed a claim to recover the merchandise that
was being held by the Government. In response to this claim, the prosecutor obtained a court order which required Boyd to produce a document evidencing his
ownership of the merchandise. Boyd refused to produce the document on the
grounds that to do so would violate his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination and his right, under the fourth amendment, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court held that suits for forfeitures are quasicriminal in nature and to compel production of the document would violate
Boyd's fourth and fifth amendment rights.
81. Id. at 634. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693 (1965). In Plymouth Sedan, the Government filed suit to obtain forfeiture of
an automobile that had been used to transport liquor illegally. The liquor was
seized from the automobile in violation of the fourth amendment because the police officers conducted the search and seizure without probable cause. The Court
agreed with the automobile owner's contention that the illegally seized evidence
should be excluded from the forfeiture trial because forfeiture is in the nature of a
criminal case and therefore the fourth amendment attaches.
82. Boyd at 634. See also Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893). In the
Lees case, the defendant faced a $1000 penalty if he were convicted of illegally
employing aliens. This penalty was sufficiently punitive to be labeled a criminal
penalty; as a result, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied in the proceedings.
83. See supra notes 80 & 82.
84. See supra notes 80-81.
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not applied.'8 The standard of proof in a quasi-criminal case is the
preponderance of the evidence. With the important exceptions of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, civil and quasi-criminal procedures are the same."
Before the RICO civil remedies can be categorized, the unusual and unique remedies87 of divestiture, dissolution, injunction
85. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914). In Regan, the defendant was
fined $1000 for violating the Alien Immigration Act. The defendant contended
that since the $1000 fine was a penalty, the cause of action was in the nature of a
criminal case and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof used in criminal cases should apply. The Court held that the Boyd and Lees cases were limited
in scope to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination which "is of
broader scope than are the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth Amendment
governing trials in criminal prosecutions." Id. at 50.
86. Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909). The Court in Hepner upheld a directed verdict in a quasi-criminal case:
[T]he Lees and Boyd cases do not modify or disturb but recognize the
general rule that penalties may be. recovered by civil actions, although
such actions may be so far criminal in their nature that the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself in such actions in respect
to any matters involving, or that may involve, his being guilty of a criminal offense.
Id. at 112.
87. While the criminal penalties provided in section 1963 have a deterrent effect on racketeer infiltration of legitimate business enterprises the
principal utility of S. 1961 may well be found to exist in its civil remedy
provisions--injunction, divestiture and dissolution-contained in section
1964, supported as they are by broad discovery and procedural devices
contained in sections 1965 and 1968 ....
These time-tested remedies,
particularly when used in conjunction with civil investigative demands
contained in section 1968, should enable the government to intervene in
many situations which are not susceptible to proof of a criminal violation. Thus in contrast to a criminal proceeding the civil procedure under
which 1964 actions are governed, with its lesser standard of proof, nonjury adjudication process, amendment of the pleadings, etc., will provide
a valuable new method of attacking the evil aimed at in the bill. The
relief offered by these equitable remedies would also seem to have a
greater potential than that of penal sanctions for actually removing the
criminal figure from a particular organization and enjoining him from engaging in similar activity. Finally these remedies are flexible, allowing of
several alternate courses of action for dealing with a particular type of
predatory activity and they may also be effectively monitored by the
court to insure that its decrees are not violated.
Letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Senator John L.
McClellan (then acting chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and'
Procedures, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate)(Aug. 11, 1969).
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and treble damages must be examined, followed by a definitional
framework for "punitive damages" and "penalties."" The tests
used by the Supreme Court to determine whether the legislature
has written a criminal (penal) or civil (regulatory-compensatory)
law89 will be set forth. These tests will then be applied to the RICO
civil remedies."
RICO CviL REMEDIES PARALLEL ANTITRUST REMEDIES
The legislative history of the RICO statute indicates that the
statute was patterned after the antitrust laws.' 1 The RICO statute
like the Sherman Act was designed to attack anti-competitive activity.92 The remedies'of divestiture, injunctive relief, dissolution
and treble damages, as well as the broad discovery provisions that
are found in the RICO statute, parallel provisions of the antitrust
laws. With one exception," there are no court cases dealing with
RICO civil remedies; however, analogous antitrust cases provide
support for these unique remedies.
The remedy of divestiture was upheld in the landmark antitrust decision of United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co."
In that case du Pont was ordered to divest itself of a large holding
of General Motors stock. This divestiture resulted in a great reduction in the market price of the du Pont stock. The Supreme Court
in du Pont stated:
Courts are not authorized in civil proceedings to punish antitrust
violators, and relief must not be punitive. But courts are author88. See infra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 130-65 and accompanying text.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 166-215.

91. In 1967, the 90th Congress considered two bills. Senate Bill 2048 was to
be an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibiting the unreported in-

vestment of income. The bill was intended to control organized crime's infiltration
into legitimate business by using the powerful antitrust law procedures and remedies. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
Senate Bill 2049 was also proposed and prohibited "the acquisition of an interest in a business affecting interstate commerce with income derived from listed
criminal activities." S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1) (1967). This bill authorized the government and third parties to seek injunctions to restrain violations of
Senate Bill 2049. It also provided a treble damage remedy. Id. § 4(b)(c).
These bills were never enacted but they were the seeds of RICO. These concepts were studied and debated and took final form as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
92. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
94. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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ized, indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse effect of such a decree on private
interests ....

[Tihe Government cannot be denied the latter remedy because economic hardship, however severe, may result."6
Divestiture is permitted only when there is no effective remedy which is less harsh; therefore, to order divestiture when there
is an effective remedy that is less harsh would be the imposition of
a penalty."6 A criminal penalty cannot be imposed unless criminal
procedural protections are made available to the defendant. The
RICO civil remedy of divestiture may have a profound economic
impact on the defendant. Nevertheless, the du Pont case illustrates
that economic impact alone may not be enough to merit the criminal penalty label. However, a court may not order divestiture if
there is a less harsh, effective remedy available.
The civil remedy of injunction has been upheld in cases involving antitrust violations and other activities which adversely affect interstate commerce. The legislative history of RICO civil provisions indicates that the civil remedy of injunction is designed to
protect against such adverse effects on interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court in In re Debs" held that the commerce clause authorizes the federal government through injunctive relief granted
by its courts to restrain or remove obstructions to interstate
commerce:
[Tihe jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient times ....
[S]uch jurisdic-

tion is not ousted by the fact ,that the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in themselves violations of the criminal

law .... [T]he proceeding by injunction is of a civil character,
and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt . .8

Several acts, including the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act," the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 1' "
95. Id. at 326-27.
96. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602-03
(1951).
97. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
98. Id. at 599. See also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1896) where the Court stated: "Congress having the control of interstate
commerce, has also the duty of protecting it, and it is entirely competent for that
body to give the remedy by injunction as more efficient than any other civil remedy." Id. at 343.
99. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-333 (1976).
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and the Federal Meat Inspection Act,101 have provided a civil action for injunction as an alternative to a criminal prosecution.
Dissolution is another remedy common to antitrust law and
RICO civil provisions. A court ordered dissolution requires the defendant to terminate the enterprise. In Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,' 0 2 a Clayton Act antitrust
case, the Court decreed complete dissolution, emphasizing that the
pinch on private interests is not relevant to fashioning an antitrust
remedy because the public interest is the main concern. Even
though dissolution has harsh effects, the courts have labeled the
remedy "remedial," so that civil rather than criminal procedures
are applicable.
The antitrust provision authorizing recovery of treble damages
was designed to deter antitrust violative conduct, to deprive the
violators of the fruits of their illegal conduct and to compensate
the injured party. 0 3 RICO civil provisions provide a treble damage
remedy. The purposes of the Acts are similar, and antitrust case
law provides precedent approving this type of remedy. Despite this
antitrust precedent, a logical argument could be made that treble
damages are punitive damages because they do more than just
compensate-they deter and punish.
The remedies of divestiture, dissolution, injunction and treble
damages are harsh, but Congress clearly expressed its remedial intent which is found in the words of the RICO Act itself: "The provisions of this title. . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes."' 4
The only court which has addressed the remedial/punitive issue in relation to a RICO civil action is the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. In United States v. Cappetto,"'5 the seventh circuit
stated:
Section 1964 provides for a civil action in which only equitable
relief can be granted. The relief authorized by that section is remedial not punitive and is of a type traditionally granted by the
courts of equity. It is the same kind of equitable relief that federal courts have been granting for generations in civil actions
100. 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1976).
101. 21 U.S.C. §§ 674-676 (1976).

102. 395 U.S. 464 (1969). See also International Boxing Club of New York v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
103. E.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
104. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941.
105. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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under Section 4 of the Sherman Act and Section 15 of the Clayton Act.1
This clear statement by the court does not address the complex
issue. The court is saying that the section 1964 civil remedies are
remedial not punitive because this type of relief has been traditionally granted in the antitrust area. This type of reasoning avoids
the issue of what is "remedial" and what is "punitive."
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PENAL SANCTIONS

The general rule of the common law is that damages are
designed to compensate the plaintiff for the actual harm or loss he
has suffered as a result of the defendant's wrongdoing. 110 However,
there is an exception to this general common law rule. The class of
damages within the exception has been variously labeled "punitive," "exemplary," "vindictive," "smart money," "added," "presumptive," or "speculative. "108 These damages go beyond compensation and are designed to punish or deter.'" However, some
courts do not view these damages as punishment or deterrence but,
rather, as compensation for injury such as mental distress that
goes beyond material loss. The damages are difficult to measure,110
and the punitive damages compensate for the intangible harm.
Usually this class of damages is awarded only if there is an element
of oppression, malice, gross negligence or fraud."11
The doctrine of punitive damages is well established in American jurisprudence. 1 2 Compensation and punishment are both ac106. Id. at 1357.
107. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH AcTIONS § 177 (1972).
108. Id. § 182, at 356-57.
109. Id. at 357.
110. Id. at 358.
111. Id. at 359.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 901 (1977) which provides:
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are based upon
the purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable. These purposes
are:
a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms;
b) to determine rights;
c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and
d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful
self-help.
(emphasis added).
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cepted goals of the civil law in almost every state.' 8 Punitive
damages "are defended as furnishing a needed deterrent to wrongdoing, in addition to that furnished by criminal punishment.""'
Although punitive damages are well established in the law,
they have been criticized. The main objection has been that punishment is the goal of criminal law and punishment should have no
place in the law of torts because the object of the tort law is to
compensate." 5
Some courts have held that punitive damages should not be
allowed if the conduct in question is punishable under the criminal
law. 1" ' The reason these courts have given is that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution prohibits punishing twice for the
same offense. Exposing a defendant to criminal as well as punitive
sanctions would subject the defendant to double punishment.
However, the United States Supreme Court has expressly ruled to
the contrary when the Court has found that the remedy falls
within the class of sanctions labeled "punitive damages"" 7 rather
than the class of sanctions labeled "penal.""8 The majority of
courts reject the double punishment rationale, in the punitive
damages context, because punitive damages are a private remedy
rather than a public sanction." The penal sanctions rectify the
harm suffered by the public whereas punitive damages rectify the
harm suffered by a private citizen.
Legislation has also modified the general common law rule
that a plaintiff may only recover for the actual harm or loss he has
suffered. Statutes have imposed penalties as a form of liquidated
damages. 20 In patent law'' and antitrust law," 2 statutes have au113.

Only four states (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washing-

ton) reject the doctrine of exemplary damages. Two other states (New Hampshire

and Michigan) allow punitive damages but describe them as compensation for
intangible harm. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 78, at 278-80 (1935). See also H.
McGREGOR, DAMAGES §§ 300-05, at 218-22 (13th ed. 1972).
114. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77, at 275 (1935).
115. See 2 S. GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE 244 n. 2 (3d ed. 1972).
116. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Louisville N.A. & C.R.
Co. v. Wolfe, 128 Ind. 347, 27 N.E. 606 (1891); Pixley v. Catey, 102 Ind. App. 213,
1 N.E.2d 658 (1936); Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.W. 607 (1888); Annot.,
16 A.L.R. 771, 801 (1922); Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115, 1122 (1939).
117. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).

118. See generally infra notes 130-65 and accompanying text.
119. J. STEIN, supra note 107, § 202, at 414 (1972).

120.

See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938) (penalty

provision of the Revenue Act of 1928 is intended to provide compensation for
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thorized treble damage awards. In the patent law cases 3 8 as well as
the antitrust cases,1 24 the courts have found the treble damage provisions to be remedial not'penal.
Although there is more than ample precedent for punitive
damages, there must be some crossover point or borderline which
separates punitive damages from penal sanctions. It is at that
point or line that punitive damages cease being a method for compensating for intangible harm or providing liquidated compensation. It is at that point or line that vengeance, deterrence and punishment become the objective of the statute.
The case law involving the terms "remedial," "compensatory"
and "regulatory" is often confusing and unclear. There is an overlap in the way the courts use the terms and in the concepts themselves. Recent civil legislation is increasingly blending the goals of
deterrence, regulation, compensation and punishment. This blend
is evident in the RICO civil provisions, the antitrust field, s2 the
Truth-in-Lending Act 2s and Price Control statutes."17
harm to the government). See also the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640
(1976). Regarding this Act, one court stated: "The Court concludes ... that the
primary purpose of § 1640 is remedial. The accumulative damage is meant to encourage debtors to seek their remedy under the Act, and it liquidates an uncertain
damage." Porter v. Household Fin. of Columbus, 385 F. Supp. 336, 342-43 (S.D.
Ohio 1974). See also the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) (liquidated damages in the form of double the amount of unpaid wages assessed against
an employer who violated the Act).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
123. Beacon Folding Mach. Co. v. Rotary Mach. Co., 17 F.2d 934 (D. Mass.
1927); Standard Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 9 F.2d 453 (S.D. Ill. 1925);
Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Owen, 293 F. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1923).
124. Hicks v. Bekins Moving and Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1837);
Sullivan v. Assoc. Billposters and Distributors, 6 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1925); United
Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1916).
125. See Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or
Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 132 (1942).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
The Truth-in-Lending Act ultimately serves the dual purpose of providing a remedy for harm to the monetary interests of individuals while
serving to deter socially undesirable lending practices. Congress focused
on the individual consumer of credit as the person primarily injured who
should be encouraged to prosecute actions and should be allowed to recover directly and adequately for harms done.
Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 1977).
127. See, e.g., Popplewell v. Stevenson, 185 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1950) (action
brought by tenant to recover penalty for over-charge in violation of the Emer-
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One court admitted that the penalty provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970128 were penal but reasoned
that the penalties were necessary to effectuate the policies behind
the Act. 1 9 The Supreme Court has developed tests to determine
when the crossover point or borderline has been passed. However,
the tests are not easy to apply, and the weight given to various
factors of each test has not been clearly defined.
TESTS USED BY THE COURTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
LEGISLATURE HAS WRITTEN A "CRIMINAL" OR "CIVIL" LAW

To determine whether an act of the legislature is penal or regulatory in character is a problem that "has been extremely difficult
and elusive of solution."18 0 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 8 '
the Court summarized the traditional factors courts use to determine whether an act of the legislature is penal, compensatory or
regulatory in character. The factors of the test are:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [31 whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
gency Price Control Act of 1942).
A suit of that kind brought by the Administrator is not intended to compensate or reimburse the injured party for the injury sustained by the
exaction of rent in excess of the ceiling. Instead, it is an action for penalty and does not survive the death of the landlord .... But a suit
brought by the tenant is one for compensation for injury suffered as the
result of the exaction of rent above the ceiling. The compensation is measured in terms of damage outlined in the statute, but that is merely an
arbitrary yardstick fixed by Congress for determining the compensation.
It is still a suit for compensation as distinguished from one for penalty
...and it did not abate on the death of the defendant.
Id. at 113.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
129. In the case sub judice, candor compels us to concede that the punitive aspects of the OSHA penalties, particularly for a "willful" violation, are far more apparent than any "remedial" features. However, a
deliberate and conscious refusal to abate a hazardous condition may
bring about a situation where a heavy civil penalty might be needed to
effect compliance with safety standards. In any event, we have now come
too far down the road to hold that a civil penalty may not be assessed to
enforce observance of the legislative policy.
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d
1200, 1204 (3d Cir. 1974).
130. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
131. Id.

[1982:4131

RICO CIVIL REMEDIES

[4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and [71 whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter18
native purpose assigned. 2
The Court in Kennedy held that section 349(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provided the sanction of forfeiture of citizenship for draft avoidance, was unconstitutional because it imposed punishment without providing the
procedural safeguards of. the fifth and sixth amendments."' The
Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and determined
that the provision dealing with forfeiture of citizenship was intended as punishment and there Was no alternative purpose to
which the forfeiture could be rationally connected.
In the recent Supreme Court case, United States 0. Ward,'"
the Court outlined a two-step test for determining whether a penalty is criminal, quasi-criminal or civil:
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other .... Second,
where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil
penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention . . . .In regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted that
'only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute on such a ground.'""
Since the Ward case is the latest decision in this area, a close
analysis of the decision is in order. The issue in Ward centered
around section 311(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act which provides for the imposition of a "civil penalty" against
the owner or operator of an onshore facility which discharges hazardous substances into navigable waters. This section authorized a
penalty of up to $5,000 for each violation of the Act. Before assessing this penalty, the Secretary of the agency was to take into account "the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or
132. Id. at 168-69 (parenthetical numbers added for clarification and citations following each factor deleted to simplify).
133. Id. at 186.
134. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
135. Id. at 248-49 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
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operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the
violation." 36
The money collected from these "civil penalties" were to be
paid into a revolving fund which was to be used to finance the removal, containment or dispersal of oil discharged into navigable
waters and to defray the costs of administering the Act." 7 Another
section of the Act allowed the government to collect the costs of
dealing with the spill. 38 This section was independent of the civil
penalty section. Section 311(b)(5) of the Act required any person
in charge of a vessel or of an offshore facility to report the spill to
the government agency; the failure to report exposed the person to
a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than
one year. 3 9
The defendant contended that the reporting requirement violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the civil penalty was in substance a form of punishment and
therefore the proceeding to assess the "civil penalty" was, in reality, criminal. The defendant contended that since the civil case
was actually a criminal case, then the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was triggered, and the defendant could
not be compelled to report the spill.
The Court in Ward found that Congress had expressly labeled
the sanction a "civil penalty"; therefore, step one of the two-step
test was satisfied. 40 The Court then addressed the second part of
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976).
137. Id. § 1321(1).

138. Id. § 1321(f).

139. Id. § 1321(b)(5).

140. The first step of the test which involves determining whether Congress

expressly or impliedly indicated in preference for either the criminal or civil label
is drawn from a line of cases. A representative case cited by the Court is One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972). One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones involved a forfeiture of imported merchandise not included in a declara-

tion and entry which was required by a tariff provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1980).
Prior to the civil suit under the relevant statute, the defendant was acquitted
of criminal charges for the same conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The defendant in
the criminal proceeding intervened in the civil proceeding and argued that his

acquittal on charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 barred the forfeiture. The Su-

preme Court reasoned that since criminal intent must be proven in the criminal
case and there is no such requirement in a civil case, an acquittal on the criminal
charge may have involved a finding that the physical act was not done with the
requisite intent. The Court noted the difference in the quantum of proof necessary in criminal and civil cases and that this difference precludes application of

the doctrine of collateral estoppel because, as to the issue raised, it did not consti-
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the test: whether despite the clear intent of Congress to make the
sanction a civil penalty, Congress nevertheless provided for sanctions so punitive in effect as to transform the civil remedy into a
14 1
criminal penalty.
The court considered the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors 42
and found that only the fifth factor-whether the behavior is already a crime' 43-was in favor of the respondent's position. Section
13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899144 makes criminal the
same conduct Ward was being penalized for in the civil case. The
Court did not give much weight to this factor and emphasized that
Congress has the power to provide both a criminal and civil sanction for the same act or omission. ' The Court was not persuaded
tute an adjudication by the preponderance of the evidence burden applicable in
civil proceedings.
Regarding the intent of Congress, the Court stated, "Congress could and did
order both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing them. There is no
reason for frustrating that design ....

The question of whether a given sanction

is civil or criminal is one of statutory construction." 409 U.S. at 236-37.
141. A representative case cited by the Court which embodies the second
step of the two-part test is Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956),
in which the petitioner was convicted, in a criminal trial, of fraudulently purchasing motor vehicles from the government in violation of the Surplus Property Act
of 1944, 58 Stat. 765, 780, 50 U.S.C. App. 1633-1636 (1946) (repealed 1949). The
government later filed a civil suit to recover $2,000 on each of five counts of a
complaint based on § 26(b)(1) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944. Petitioner
contended that this second suit placed him twice in jeopardy in violation of the
fifth amendment and having once been convicted he could not be punished a second time. The issue was whether § 26(b)(1) is civil or penal. The Court viewed the
remedy provisions as providing a form of liquidated damages and upheld the provisions because the liquidated damages were reasonable. "On this record it cannot
be said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in the Act is so unreasonable or excessive that it transformed what was clearly intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty." 350 U.S. at 154.
142. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
145. The Court cited Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938), and
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972).
In Mitchell the defendant was acquitted on the criminal charge of willfully
attempting to evade federal income taxes. The defendant contended that the acquittal on the criminal charges could be set up as res judicata in a civil action
brought by the government seeking an additional fifty percent of a tax deficiency
under the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 293, 45 Stat. 791. The Court rejected
the defendant's assertion, stating that the "acquittal on a criminal charge is not a
bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the
same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled."
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that respondent had "offered the 'clearest proof' that the penalty
here in question is punitive in either purpose or effect.""' 6
Justice Blackmun concurring, joined by Justice Marshall,
opined that a more careful analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez
standards was necessary. He concluded that monetary assessments
are a traditional civil remedy, do not impose an affirmative disability or restraint, and serve remedial purposes dissociated from punishment. Justice Blackmun also concluded that the remedial purpose of the monetary penalty was to defray the clean up expenses,
and for this reason the goal of the statute was compensation rather
303 U.S. at 397. But the Mitchell Court further indicated that "where the objective of the subsequent action likewise is punishment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy; and double jeopardy is precluded by the Fifth
Amendment whether the verdict was an acquittal or a conviction." Id. at 398.
The Mitchell Court emphasized that "Congress may impose both a criminal
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for thte double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense." 303 U.S. at 399.
146. Ward, 448 U.S. at 251. A representative case for the "clearest proof"
requirement of this test is Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) which involved the constitutionality of § 202(n) of the Social Security Act (78 Stat. 1083,
as amended 42 U.S.C. § 402(n)). Section 402(n) provides for termination of old
age, survivor and disability insurance benefits for aliens who are deported under §
241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 2151(a)) on the
grounds specified in § 202(n). The appellant was deported pursuant to §
241(a)(6)(C)(1) for having been a member of the Communist Party and his social
security benefits were terminated. The appellant contended the termination of
payments was a punishment, that criminal procedural rights attach, and therefore he was deprived of the sixth amendment right to trial. The appellant further
contended that an imposition of punishment by legislative act renders § 202(n) a
bill of attainder; and that the punishment is imposed for past conduct not unlawful when engaged in and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition on ex
post facto laws.
The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the penalty can be labeled
as a punishment. If the penalty is not a punishment the constitutional protections
sought by the appellant are inapplicable. The Court upheld § 202(n) because the
appellant did not present clear proof that Congress intended the termination of
benefits to be a punishment.
We observe initially that only the clearest proof could suffice to establish
the unconstitutionality of a statute on such ground .... Moreover, the
presumption of constitutionality with which this enactment, like any
other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it.
Id. at 617. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
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than deterrence or retribution. 14 7
The sole dissenter, Mr. Justice Stevens, concluded that the
monetary penalty was a criminal sanction because the penalty was
not designed to repay the government for the clean-up costs. He
reasoned that the statute was intended to "exact retribution for
causing the spill" 14 8 because the penalty was based on criteria
which have no relation to regulation or compensation; the criteria
included the prior record and culpability of the party. Clean-up
measures undertaken by the party were to have no bearing on the
imposition or amount of the civil penalty, and payment of the
clean-up costs did not relieve a party of liability for the civil penalties. Therefore, Mr. Justice Stevens concluded that the civil penalty was in substance a criminal sanction and the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable because this
was, in effect, a criminal proceeding.14 9
The respondent in Ward also asserted that, even if the penalty
were not sufficiently criminal in nature to trigger the full panopoly
of criminal procedural protections, the penalty was sufficiently penal to be classified as "quasi-criminal." If Ward were able to establish the "quasi-criminal" nature of the penalty, then the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination would attach.
Ward relied on the language of the Court in Boyd v. United
Statei:
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the

commission of offences against the law are of this quasi-criminal
nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ....

1"

The Ward Court distinguished the penalty for discharging
hazardous substances from the forfeiture penalties in Boyd, One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,'15 and United States v.
United States Coin & Currency,162 by stating that the forfeiture
penalties had "no correlation to any damages sustained by society
147. Ward, 488 U.S. at 255-57.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 258.
Id. at 258-59.
116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (emphasis added). See supra note 80.
380 U.S. 693 (1965). See supra note 82.
401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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or to the cost of enforcing the law," 5 3 whereas the penalty for discharging hazardous substances "is much more analogous to traditional civil damages.' '54 The Ward Court applied the same reasoning to the fixed monetary penalty' 5 5 involved in Lees v. United
States:156
[I]n light of what we have found to be overwhelming evidence
that Congress intended to create a penalty civil in all respects and
quite weak evidence of any countervailing punitive purpose or effect it would be quite anomalous to hold that § 311(b)(6) created
Clause
a criminal penalty for purposes of the Self-Incrimination
1 7
but a civil penalty for all other purposes. 5
Another leading case which focused on the meaning of the
word "penal" is Huntington v. Attrill.156 In Huntington, the Court
examined a New York state statute which provided that a corporate officer was personally liable to creditors if he falsely certified
that the entire capital of the corporation was paid-in. The plaintiff
in Huntington obtained judgment in a New York state court
against the corporate officer, Attrill. The plaintiff in Huntington
brought suit in a Maryland state court to obtain satisfaction of the
New York State judgment. The defendant asserted that the State
of Maryland was powerless to execute the penal laws of another
state. Thus, the issue in Huntington was whether the New York
statute was a penal law. Justice Gray, writing for the Court, stated:
In the municipal law of England and America, the words "penal"
and "penalty" have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily they denote punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary,
imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offense against
its laws ....
Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which, by
the English and American Constitutions, the executive of the
state has the power to pardon.159
The Court in Huntington addressed two aspects of the term
"penal law": (1) whether payment is exacted to punish or compen153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Ward, 488 U.S. at 254.
Id.
Id.
150 U.S. 476 (1893).
Ward, 448 U.S. at 254.
146 U.S. 657 (1892).
Id. at 667.
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sate, and (2) which party, the private individual or the state, collects the payment. The second aspect deserves close scrutiny. The
fact that the government is the plaintiff does not inescapably lead
to the conclusion that the action is one for a penalty. The Ward
case is an example of an action brought by the government, yet the
court in Ward determined that the monetary penalty was remedial
rather than penal. 10 In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta, 6 ' the United States Supreme Court upheld the
right of the City of Atlanta to bring an antitrust suit to recover
treble damages against a contractor who had illegally conspired to
overcharge the City for water pipes purchased by the City for use
in the City's water system. The court held that "[t]he City was
. . .injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of fur-

nishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe.
A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money
wrongfully induced is injured in his property."' 2
Another important consideration in the over-all punitive-penal
scheme is the distinction between regulation and punishment. The
United States Supreme Court in two cases, Troop v. Dulles' 8 and
Perez v. Brownwell,'" drew this important distinction. Both cases
involved the sanction of forfeiture of citizenship, yet the court
reached a different result in each case.
In Troop a plurality of the Supreme Court justices found that
forfeiture of citizenship as a sanction for war-time desertion was a
penalty:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the
statute imposes a disability for purposes of punishment-that is,
to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been
considered penal. But a statute has been considered non-penal if
it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some
160. See generally supra notes 140-57.
161. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).

162. Id. at 396.

163. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
164. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). Perez was overruled in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253, 268 (1966). The Court held that Congress has no power to divest a person of

his United States citizenship because the fourteenth amendment provides that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the
United States ... " and this amendment controls the status of citizenship and
Congress has no power to override this provision. Afroyim at 257-68. Even though
Perez has been overruled the regulatory purposes of a statute are still considered
in determining whether the remedy is remedial/regulatory or penal.
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other legitimate governmental purpose."'

In Perez, decided the same day as Troop, the Supreme Court
faced the same issue. The petitioner challenged a statute which
provided that persons who voted in a foreign election forfeited
their citizenship. The Court held that the statute was a valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate foreign affairs.
Troop and Perez illustrate a distinction between regulation
and punishment. The penalty in both was forfeiture of citizenship.
The Court in Perez upheld the penalty because it furthered a valid
regulatory goal. In Troop the Court found the forfeiture of citizenship to be a penalty because the court could not find a tie between
the penalty and a regulatory goal.
Application of the Tests to RICO Civil Remedies
Whether Section 1964 sanctions and remedies are "penal" or
"regulatory/remedial" is probably the most important issue involving a RICO section 1964 civil action. Aware of the potential constitutional problem, Congress made it very clear that RICO is intended to be a remedial statute. The RICO statutory language
provides that "the provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. ' " RICO civil remedies
were intended to be remedial, but Milwaukee City Attorney John
F. Kitzke clearly recognized the deterrent effect of the remedies
when he stated: "[W]e should make arson as expensive as possible,
not solely to obtain money for the city, but for the far more important premise of dissuading people from damaging property and the
67
possibility of killing or injuring people by the act of arson. 1
The RICO civil remedies satisfy step one of the two-part test
outlined in the Ward case 1" because RICO civil remedies are expressly labeled "civil" remedies. 1s" Step two of the test asks
whether, despite the congressional intent to provide civil penalties,
the "statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate that intention. '170 The punitive purpose or effect must
be established by "only the clearest proof. 17 1 In establishing the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Troop, 356 U.S. at 96.
Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
"Civil remedies" is the heading for 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
Id.
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the seven factors outpunitive purpose or effect the court looks7to
2
lined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.1
The first factor is "whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint.' 71 Dissolution of an enterprise would
disable the owner from carrying on any further business involving
the enterprise; however, disabling a person from carrying on an enterprise does not foreclose other employment opportunities. The
RICO civil remedy of injunction is a restraint, but the person is
restrained only from carrying on certain business activities; an injunction is not comparable to incarceration. Divestiture is only a
partial restraint or disability, and treble damages are neither a disability nor a restraint.
The second Mendoza-Martinez factor asks whether the sanction has historically been regarded as punishment.17 4 Treble damages are punitive damages and are, as such, well established in the
common law1 M and in state and federal legislation.1 7 Punitive
damages have consistently withstood the challenge that punitive
damages are punishment. Courts frequently 'award treble damages
in antitrust 1 7 and patent 178 litigation and justify the award 17as
compensation for intangible harm and immeasurable damage. 9
Divestiture is a harsh remedy, but it is not punishment unless it is
imposed in a situation where there is a less harsh, effective remedy.180 In fact, divestiture has been labeled a civil remedy.1 81 Injunction is also a traditional civil remedy. Several statutes provide
a civil action for an injunction as an alternative to a criminal action. 1 "' There is also sufficient precedent in antitrust law to establish dissolution as a civil remedy rather than punishment. 18 1
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor focuses upon whether the
sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter.'" In a RICO
civil action the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has vio172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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lated the RICO criminal provisions.18 The RICO civil plaintiff
must prove that the defendant has either (1) invested income derived from a pattern of racketeering in an enterprise that affects
interstate commerce or (2) acquired an interest in an enterprise
through a racketeering activity or (3) participated in any enterprise through a racketeering activity."86 The plaintiff in a RICO
civil case must prove the same elements as a prosecutor in a RICO
criminal case must prove. In order to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, the RICO civil plaintiff must prove the elements
of at least two crimes that fall within the category of a racketeering
activity. 187 The statutory list of racketeering activities includes a
great number of traditional crimes, all of which require an element
of criminal intent. The conduct subject to a civil penalty in the
Ward case was also subject to criminal punishment. The Court did
not give much weight to this factor because Congress has the
power to provide both a criminal and civil sanction for the same
act or omission. 88 The Court would probably give little weight to
the "scienter factor" in a challenge to a RICO civil remedy.
The fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor asks "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence.' 89 Congress clearly intended RICO civil provisions
to be remedial.'90 The RICO civil remedies of treble damages, dissolution, and injunction deter violations of the RICO provisions;
however, a deterrent function alone does not transform a civil statute into a penal statute. A deterrent function is evident in several
major statutes; nevertheless, these statutes have been labeled "remedial" or "regulatory" rather than "penal."' 1 If there is a correlation between the damage sustained by the victim and the civil
penalty imposed, the court will view the civil penalty as compensation rather than punishment.' 92
Treble damages have been consistently upheld against challenges that they are punishment. The courts have viewed treble
damages as compensation for intangible harm and immeasurable
185.

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

189.
190.

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

186. Id.
187. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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damage. 193 Even though the remedies of divestiture and dissolution
may impose severe economic hardship, they are not punishment
unless the court imposes these remedies when there is a less harsh
yet effective remedy. 19' Injunctions are not punishment, especially
when they are granted to restrain or remove obstructions to interstate commerce. 95
A severe remedy does not necessarily mean that the remedy is
punishment. Forfeiture of citizenship,"' dissolution,1 97 treble damages,198 divestiture, 9 9 civil penalties, 0 0 and liquidated damages 0 1
may have a severe impact on the defendant, but these remedies
have been upheld despite their severity, justified on grounds that
such sanctions serve compensatory or regulatory purposes.
The fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor is "whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime ' ' 20 2 and is similar to the third
"scienter" factor 20 8 because criminal conduct generally involves an
element of intent. The conduct subject to sanction in a RICO civil
action is the same racketeering activity proscribed by the RICO
criminal provisions.2 ' A RICO civil plaintiff must prove at least
two racketeering crimes in order to obtain a favorable judgment.20
The Court in Ward did not give much weight to this fifth factor
because Congress has the power to provide both a criminal and
civil sanction for the same act or omission.2 0 6 The Court would give
little weight to the fifth factor in a challenge to RICO civil
remedies.
The sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor focuses upon whether
there is a rational, alternative purpose assignable to the sanction.20 The alternative purposes that have been recognized by the
Court are compensation and regulation. The compensation purpose
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
supra note 164 and accompanying text and text following 165.
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
supra notes 147, 154-57 and accompanying text.
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
supra note 142-45 and accompanying text.
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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is illustrated by the cases upholding civil penalties, 0 8 treble damage awards 20 9 and liquidated damages.21 0 The Perez case is an outstanding example of a severe sanction-forfeiture of citizenship-being upheld as a civil sanction because an alternative
regulatory purpose could be assigned to the statute.211 Increasingly,
statutes blend compensatory and regulatory purposes.212 The purpose of the RICO Act is to protect interstate commerce from the
harmful effects of organized crime activity and to provide effective
remedies for those who are injured in their person or property by
such racketeering activity.21 Thus, the RICO statute has the dual
purpose of regulation and compensation. An alternative rational
purpose is assignable to the RICO "civil remedies."
The seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether the sanction
is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." The
RICO civil remedies of divestiture, dissolution, injunction and
treble damages are harsh remedies but they are not excessive in
relation to their alternative purposes assigned. Treble damages
provide compensation for intangible and immeasurable harm.
However, treble damage awards must certainly approach the excessive point. Dissolution and divestiture have the potential to be excessive, and are in fact excessive if they are ordered when there is a
less harsh effective remedy. But if divestiture or dissolution are
necessary in order to provide an effective remedy they are not excessive. These remedies have not been labeled excessive when applied in the antitrust field. It is this seventh factor which provides
an outer limit to sanctions imposed by a statute which has a valid
alternative purpose, RICO civil remedies approach but do not
reach this outer limit. An excessive punitive effect must be established by the "clearest proof"' 15 and since these remedies are in
the gray area they would fall short of this degree of proof.
CONCLUSION

At some point along a continuum, labeled at one end remedial
208. See supra notes 147, 154-57 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
211. See generally supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 125-29. (Ward is an illustration of compensation and
regulation. The act furthers the regulatory goal of protecting navigable waters.)
213. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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and at the other end penal, constitutional protections become necessary. Individuals and society need regulation and effective remedies, but defendants need procedural protections when they are
faced with the possibility of a penal sanction.
Compensation is the traditional goal of the civil law, but punitive damages are well-established in American jurisprudence.
RICO civil provisions were designed by Congress to be regulatory
and remedial in nature, but they clearly have a deterrent effect.
RICO civil remedies do not violate the Constitution because
the statute passes the two-step test outlined in Ward. It passes the
first step of the test because Congress expressly labeled section
1964 remedies as "civil remedies." The section 1964 provisions pass
the second part of the test because the remedies are not criminal
penalties and there are alternative purposes which are assignable
to the RICO civil remedies. The RICO civil remedies are in the
gray area between remedy and penalty, and it would be difficult for
a RICO civil defendant to offer the "clearest proof" that the remedies are punitive in effect. The courts should defer to the legislature unless the "clearest proof" is offered that section 1964 remedies are penal. RICO civil remedies are remedial and regulatory in
nature and therefore are constitutional; however, these remedies lie
precariously close to the borderlines between the criminal, quasicriminal and civil law; on the continuum, they approach, but do
not cross over into, the penal area.
EDWARD J. RODGERS III

